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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
STUART EARL JOHNSEN, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 980073-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conditional plea of no contest to 
possession or use of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, 
a second or subsequent violation, a third degree felony. This 
Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court clearly err in determining that, 
given the close timing and sequence of the relevant events, the 
flight of the seven men out the back window of the apartment was 
not caused by the officer's act of opening the front door? 
2. Did the trial court properly determine that the 
warrantless entry of the officers into the apartment to conduct a 
1 
protective sweep was supported not only by probable cause to 
believe that a crime had been or was ongoing but also by the 
immediate need to ensure that no one was left inside the 
apartment who could harm the officers? 
The same standard of review applies to both issues. That 
is, a trial court's findings underlying a suppression motion will 
be sustained unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 939 n.4 (Utah 1994). The trial court's legal 
conclusions arising out of those findings, however, will be 
reviewed for correctness, according a measure of discretion to 
the trial court in applying the legal standard to the facts. Id. 
at 935-40. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
This case is governed by the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of possession or use of 
a controlled substance (marijuana) in a drug-free zone, a second 
or subsequent violation, and one count of possession or use of 
drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone (R. 1-2). Defendant filed 
a suppression motion to exclude the evidence found in the 
apartment in which he was apprehended (R. 18-39). Following an 
evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion (R. 18-39, 
49, 85-86). Defendant then entered a conditional plea of no 
2 
contest to the third degree felony of possession or use of 
marijuana. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the 
misdemeanor paraphernalia charge (R. 93-102). The trial court 
imposed and stayed a zero-to-five year term in the Utah State 
Prison, ordered 36 months of probation under certain specified 
conditions, and levied fines and fees in the amount of $1184 (R. 
110-11). This appeal followed (R. 122-26). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Near midnight on November 16, 1996, a citizen from an 
upstairs apartment in a duplex unit telephoned the Provo city 
police to complain of a strong odor of marijuana coming from the 
downstairs apartment (R. 71 at 6-7; R. 67 at 22; R. 84).l Two 
officers were dispatched to the duplex, where they met two 
complainants on the lawn near the stairs leading to the 
downstairs apartment (R. 71 at 6-7). The men confirmed that they 
smelled burnt marijuana coming from the apartment and told the 
police that they thought the renter of the apartment was not at 
home (Id. at 7; R. 65 at 29; R. 83). At this juncture, Officer 
Knudsen began to suspect a possible trespass or burglary in 
progress (R. 64 at 32-33). 
Standing with the complainants was a third man (R. 71 at 7; 
1
 The suppression hearing transcript has been 
photographically condensed so that four pages of transcript fit 
on a single page of the appellate record. Consequently, the 
appellate record cite is followed by "at" and the page number of 
the suppression hearing transcript. 
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R. 83). When the complainants told the officers that this 
individual had been in the downstairs apartment, Officer Knudsen 
turned his attention briefly to him. The officer testified that 
the third man smelled of burnt marijuana (R. 68 at 17, R. 64 at 
32-33). 
Just before heading downstairs to the apartment, Officer 
Knudsen noticed that the apartment door was open a couple of feet 
(R. 70 at 8; R. 83). As the two officers approached, however, 
the door was closed from the inside (Id.). Officer Knudsen then 
knocked on the door "for quite a while" (R. 128 at 18). No one 
responded. Nonetheless, the officer heard "some definite moving 
going on inside, some rustling around" (Id.). Because the 
complainants had suggested that the tenant was not at home and 
because there was plainly someone in the apartment who was not 
responding, Officer Knudsen "checked the door handle, found it 
was unlocked, [and] pushed it open . . . a few feet" (R. 70 at 9-
10). Without entering the apartment, Knudsen announced his 
presence. At the same time, both officers "got a strong odor of 
marijuana" (R. 70 at 10; R. 68 at 19; R. 65 at 30; R. 83). 
At this juncture, the officers were notified that people 
were running from a back window of the apartment building towards 
an adjacent farm (R. 128 at 19; R. 70 at 10; R. 66 at 24; R. 82). 
A foot pursuit ensued and, within fifteen minutes, seven 
individuals were caught. None of them admitted to either living 
4 
in the apartment or knowing who lived there (R. 70 at 11; R. 66 
at 24; R. 82). 
Officer Knudsen then asked two officers to conduct a 
protective sweep of the apartment. He reasoned: 
Because I couldn't find out who the owner 
[i.e. resident] was, wasn't sure if there was 
still someone in the apartment or not, I had 
Officer John and Halliday search the 
apartment. . . just for individuals, for 
safety reasons. I wasn't sure who was still 
in there. I wanted to make sure we could 
secure any people still in the apartment, or 
locate any weapons in the apartment for 
officer safety reasons. 
(R. 69 at 12). During the sweep, the officers found defendant 
hiding in the bathroom (R. 66 at 25; R. 81). They also saw drug 
paraphernalia in plain view, which formed the basis for later 
obtaining a search warrant for the apartment (R. 67 at 21; R. 65 
at 31; R. 81). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the officer's act of initially opening 
the front door of the apartment violated the Fourth Amendment 
because it was not supported by exigent circumstances. 
Consequently, he argues, all evidence observed in the apartment 
after a later protective sweep and seized at a later time 
pursuant to a search warrant should be suppressed. The State 
asserts that because the act of initially opening the door 
revealed nothing new to the police and because it did not cause 
the escape of the occupants, it is legally irrelevant to the 
5 
pivotal question of whether exigent circumstances supported the 
later warrantless entry to conduct a protective sweep. 
Defendant also argues that the later warrantless entry into 
the apartment to conduct a security sweep was unsupported by 
exigent circumstances. Defendant, however, parses the 
circumstances, rather than viewing the overall factual mosaic 
from the viewpoint of a reasonable officer dealing with an 
evolving set of circumstances. Viewed as a whole, the facts 
plainly demanded immediate police action to freeze the situation 
for officer safety reasons. The trial court so found, and the 
evidence supports that determination. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
BECAUSE THE OFFICER'S ACT OF 
OPENING THE FRONT DOOR OF THE 
APARTMENT NEITHER CAUSED THE 
OCCUPANTS TO ESCAPE OUT THE BACK 
WINDOW NOR PROVIDED THE OFFICERS 
WITH ANY CRITICAL NEW INFORMATION, 
THE ACT OF OPENING THE DOOR IS 
LEGALLY IRRELEVANT TO THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
ANALYSIS 
Defendant argues that the officer's act of opening the door 
to the apartment without consent was unlawful because it was not 
supported by exigent circumstances. Specifically, defendant 
asserts that neither the officer's suspicion of possible drug use 
in the apartment nor his concern for a possible burglary or 
trespass in progress could justify his warrantless entry. 
6 
And, in any event, argues defendant, any exigency that might have 
existed was created solely by the officer's own wrongful act of 
opening the door. See Br, of App. at 17-19, 25-28. 
In this case, however, the officer's act of opening the door has 
no relevance to the Fourth Amendment exigency analysis. 
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied 
defendant's motion to suppress, entering specific findings of 
fact detailing the chronology and timing of the pertinent events. 
See addendum A. First, as to defendant's assertion that the 
officers themselves created the exigency by opening the door, the 
trial court found: 
8. Opening the door to the apartment, under 
the totality of the facts, did not cause the 
people to flee out the back of the apartment 
as evidenced by someone closing the door as 
the officer approached followed by movement 
and rustling and the almost simultaneous 
departure of 8 [sic] people out the back as 
the officer was calling out in front. 
R. 82 or addendum A. Drawing on these facts, the trial court 
concluded: 
3. The occupants' flight from a rear window 
of the apartment as officers were attempting 
to make contact at the front door was 
virtually simultaneous with the actions of 
the door opening and calling to occupants by 
the officer. The flight was not caused by 
the officer's actions. 
R. 80 or addendum A. 
Defendant's assertion, then, that the officers created the 
exigency by opening the door, is directly contrary to the 
7 
determination of the trial court. That is, the trial court found 
that the apartment occupants were already alerted to the presence 
of the police, as evidenced by the front door being closed from 
within as the officers approached, and by the lack of response to 
the officer's knocking combined with the continued sound of 
movement within the apartment. The trial court elaborated in its 
oral ruling: 
I don't believe that we can assume that the 
opening of the door triggered the fleeing of 
occupants of that apartment. In fact, it's 
as logical to conclude that the rustling 
sound was people gathering gear and 
retreating out the back. They didn't want to 
be there any longer. And so it occurred 
virtually simultaneously. And I think if not 
triggered by the officer just being there, 
period, if they saw him as he approached, 
that it was an amazing coincidence that they 
all just decided to leave through a window 
instead of a door. 
R. 58 at 57-58. 
The record evidence supports the trial court's 
determination. While Officer Knudsen testified that he received 
word of several men fleeing the apartment after he opened the 
door, he also made clear in his testimony that the timing of the 
events was close. He stated: 
[IJmmediately after opening [the door], I got 
a strong odor of marijuana. Before I had a 
chance to set foot in the apartment, I got 
some notification from the other officer that 
some individuals were running from the back 
of the building. 
R. 70 at 10 (emphasis added). Thus, Officer Knudsen's testimony 
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supports the trial court's determination that no causal link 
existed between the officer's act of opening the door and the 
men's escape out the back window of the apartment. 
Second, even assuming arguendo that the warrantless opening 
of the door was unlawful, that act would not mandate suppression 
of evidence wholly unrelated to it. That is, the subsequent 
entry to conduct the protective sweep could still be upheld so 
long as it was supported by both probable cause and exigent 
circumstances independent of the initial door opening. Cf. State 
v. Northruo, 756 P.2d 1288, 1294 (Utah App. 1988)(reviewing court 
assumes unchallenged search warrant was based on information 
independent of illegal entry). Factually, in this case, the 
officers gained no new information as a result of opening the 
door. Indeed, Officer Knudsen testified that the apartment 
entryway was dark and that, after he opened the door, he could 
not see anybody inside (R. 70 at 10, R. 67 at 20, R. 128 at 8). 
And, while both officers testified that they detected a strong 
odor of marijuana once the door was open, this was not new 
information to either of them (R. 70 at 10, R. 68 at 19, R. 66 at 
24, R.65 at 30). The two citizen informants had already told 
them about the burnt marijuana odor coming from the downstairs 
apartment, and that information had been corroborated when 
Officer Knudsen smelled burnt marijuana on the third man, who had 
reportedly been visiting in the apartment (R. 71 at 7, R. 68 at 
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17, R. 67 at 22). 
Defendant likens the facts of this case to State v. Beavers, 
859 P.2d 9 (Utah 1993). In Beavers, however, the police reached 
across an apartment threshold to seize a suspect "within the 
constitutionally protected confines of a private residence." Id. 
at 13. Furthermore, by entering the apartment, they were able to 
observe several individuals and to corroborate information they 
had received prior to entering. Id. at 11. In contrast, here, 
while the police opened a door, they neither seized anyone as a 
result nor gained any information they did not previously have. 
See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (1998) (initial warrantless 
entry into apartment irrelevant to fourth amendment analysis). 
The facts found by the trial court and the fair inferences 
drawn from the facts render the officer's act of opening the 
apartment door superfluous to the Fourth Amendment exigency 
analysis. Because the opening of the door and the flight 
"occurred virtually simultaneously," the former could not have 
realistically caused the latter. And because the opening of the 
door did not provide the officers with any information, it 
neither justifies suppression of evidence unrelated to it nor has 
any bearing on the legality of the later warrantless entry to 
conduct a protective sweep. 
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POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED 
THAT THE WARRANTLESS ENTRY OF THE 
OFFICERS INTO THE APARTMENT TO 
CONDUCT A PROTECTIVE SWEEP WAS 
JUSTIFIED BY BOTH PROBABLE CAUSE 
AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
Defendant argues that the officers violated the Fourth 
Amendment when they entered the apartment without a warrant to 
conduct a protective sweep following the detention of the seven 
fleeing individuals. Defendant does not contest that the smell 
of marijuana, reported by two citizen informants and corroborated 
by the odor of burnt marijuana coming from an individual who had 
reportedly been inside the apartment, created the requisite 
probable cause.2 See, e.g., State v. South, 885 P.2d 795, 799 
(Utah App. 1994), remanded on other grounds, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 
1996). Rather, defendant only directly challenges the existence 
of an exigent circumstance necessary, in conjunction with 
Defendant does question the reliance of the officers on 
the information provided by the two citizen informants. See Br. 
of App. at 18, 25. However, "reliability and veracity are 
generally assumed when the informant is a citizen who receives 
nothing from the police in exchange for the information." State 
v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952, 956 (Utah App. 1993)(quoting State v. 
Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992)). In this instance, 
the two citizens had nothing to gain, and their report of a 
marijuana odor coming from the downstairs apartment was based on 
first-hand experience. In addition, Officer Knudsen personally 
detected the odor of burnt marijuana on the third man, whom the 
complainants said had recently been in the downstairs apartment. 
The third man did not contest the truth of this statement (R. 70-
71 at 7-8, R. 68 at 16-17, R. 128 at 5). The marijuana odor on 
the third man, then, served as corroboration for the information 
provided by the two citizens. 
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probable cause, for the warrantless entry into the apartment.3 
See, e.g., State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258-59 (Utah 1987); 
State v. Yoder. 935 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah App. 1997). 
First, defendant asserts that "the alleged presence of 
marijuana should not be considered to be a per se exigent 
circumstance" (Br. of App. at 18). Second, defendant asserts 
that any initially chaotic situation had been brought under 
control once the fleeing men were caught, thus obviating the 
officer safety rationale for an immediate protective sweep (Br. 
of App. at 21). Finally, defendant asserts that the officer's 
suspicions of a possible burglary or trespass in progress were 
insufficient to create an exigency (Br. of App. at 25-27).4 
Exigent circumstances are those "*that would cause a 
reasonable person to believe that entry . . . was necessary to 
prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the 
destruction of relevant evidence, escape of the suspect, or some 
other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law 
The law is well-settled that reasonable suspicion will 
justify a warrantless protective sweep of a residence incident to 
an arrest. Maryland v. Buie, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 1095 (1990). In 
this case, however, the analytical focus is on the warrantless 
entry both because it preceded the protective sweep and because 
it was not incident to an arrest. Consequently, the dual 
standards of probable cause and exigent circumstances must be 
met. See Beavers, 859 P.2d at 19 & n.12. 
4
 Defendant also argues that the officers improperly 
created their own exigency by entering the apartment initially. 
That argument, however, has already been addressed in Point One. 
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enforcement efforts.'" Beavers, 859 P.2d at 18 (quoting United 
States v. McConnev, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 
469 U.S. 824 (1984)). Exigent circumstances, like probable 
cause, "must be determined by evaluating the facts available at 
the time of the warrantless entry and search.'" Ashe, 745 P.2d 
at 1262 (citation omitted). Thus, in this instance, exigent 
circumstances must have existed at the time the officers entered 
the apartment. 
To determine whether an exigency exists, the totality of the 
circumstances must be considered. City of Orem v. Henrie, 868 
P.2d 1384, 1388 (Utah App. 1994). And, "[t]he existence of 
exigent circumstances must be based on the reasonable belief of 
the police officer." Beavers, 859 P.2d at 18. xx[E]xigency does 
not evolve from one individual fact. Instead, there is often a 
mosaic of evidence, no single part of which is itself 
sufficient." Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258. Thus, the task of a 
reviewing court "is to review the totality of facts and 
circumstances of the particular case to determine if the finding 
of exigency was proper." Id. 
Here, the trial court entered detailed findings of fact 
describing what information the officers had when they decided to 
conduct the security sweep of the apartment: 
9. Before conducting a protective sweep of 
the apartment, officers had determined, (1) 
that the neighbors had detected the odor of 
marijuana and knew the tenant not to be home; 
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(2) that a person identified by the neighbors 
as one of the people who had been in the 
apartment did smell of burned marijuana; (3) 
that someone had closed the door of the 
apartment as the officers approached on the 
stairs to speak with the people in the 
apartment; (4) that an odor of marijuana was 
emanating from the apartment's door when it 
was opened by the officer; (5) that at least 
7 people fled out the back window as officers 
were attempting to speak with them at the 
front door; and (6) that the 7 people who 
fled, when caught and brought back to the 
scene did not live in the apartment and could 
not identify who the tenant was. 
10. Out of concern for officer safety for 
fear that an individual person or persons 
might still be inside the apartment and also 
because the officers felt that any additional 
persons inside the apartment did not belong 
there and were committing a trespass or 
burglary, two officers walked through the 
apartment to check for additional suspects as 
a "security sweep." 
R. 81-82 or addendum A. From these facts, the trial court 
concluded: 
4. The actions of the occupants . . . in 
fleeing the scene and then refusing to 
identify the owner or occupant or otherwise 
explain their actions provided exigent 
circumstances justifying the warrantless 
entry into the home to determine if any crime 
was ongoing. 
5. The security sweep of the apartment after 
apprehending the people who fled from the 
apartment was justified by the probable cause 
that a crime had been or was occurring within 
the apartment coupled with exigent 
circumstances consisting of a legitimate 
concern for officer safety because of a 
potential threat from unknown persons who may 
have still been inside and the need to stop 
what appeared to be a trespass or burglary 
14 
that was taking place. 
R. 79-80 at addendum A. This ruling, carefully enumerating the 
totality of the circumstances in which the case arose, is well 
supported by the factual mosaic confronting Officer Knudsen when 
he authorized the protective sweep, causing two officers to enter 
the apartment without a warrant.5 
The mosaic consists of three parts. First, when the 
officers arrived at the apartment, they knew only that a burnt 
marijuana odor was reportedly coming from the downstairs 
apartment. The two citizens who had telephoned the police 
verified this report on the scene, noting also that they thought 
the tenant had gone to work. Officer Knudsen then gained first-
hand corroboration of the citizen report when he turned his 
attention to a third man, who had reportedly been visiting in the 
apartment and who plainly smelled of burnt marijuana. 
The second part of the factual mosaic supporting exigent 
circumstances occurred as the officers approached the apartment 
to investigate. Officer Knudsen observed that the front door of 
The State assumes, for purposes of this argument only, 
that the initial act of opening the apartment door was unlawful. 
Consequently, the fourth factor found by the trial court - "that 
an odor of marijuana was emanating from the apartment's door when 
it was opened by the officer" - will not be considered in 
evaluating the presence of exigent circumstances necessary to 
justify the warrantless entry into the apartment to conduct the 
protective sweep. Cf^ State v. Rowe, 850 P.2d 427, 428-30 (Utah 
1992)(finding no prejudice or violation of constitutional rights 
due to procedural defect in search warrant when search was 
authorized under other grounds). 
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the apartment, which had previously been open about a foot or 
two, was closed from within. The officer then knocked on the 
door repeatedly. Because he heard continued rustling and 
movement, Officer Knudsen knew there were people inside, yet no 
one responded to the knocking.6 
The final aspect of the mosaic focuses on the facts arising 
out of flight. First, seven men fled the apartment by climbing 
out a back window while the police were trying to make contact at 
the front door. When apprehended after a foot chase, they all 
insisted that they neither lived in the apartment nor knew who 
did. 
The three parts of the mosaic, when considered as a whole 
and in conjunction with the fair inferences that may reasonably 
be drawn from them, created the exigency justifying the 
warrantless entry. Certainly, the first group of facts suggested 
only a routine investigation of marijuana usage or a possible 
trespass or burglary in progress. When the second part of the 
A fair inference from these facts is that the people in 
the apartment were alerted to the presence of law enforcement 
personnel and so closed the apartment door. Their subsequent 
refusal to respond to the officer's knocking supports the 
inference that they did not want to have any contact with the 
police. The continued rustling and movement, in conjunction with 
what happened next, supports the inference that the men inside 
were making preparations for flight. See State v. Poole, 871 
P.2d 531, 535 (Utah 1994) (police officers are "entitled to draw 
reasonable inferences from the surrounding facts in light of 
thier knowledge of the area and prior experience") . 
16 
mosaic fell into place - the apartment occupants closing the door 
and refusing to respond to the police — the level of police 
uncertainty and concern plainly increased. Then, when the seven 
men unexpectedly bolted from the rear of the apartment and, when 
apprehended, refused to provide any information at all, the full 
factual mosaic fell into place to justify the officers' 
warrantless entry into the apartment. 
At that juncture, while the officers had controlled the 
fleeing men, they had no idea who still might be in the apartment 
or what might be going on in there.7 Practically, they had an 
urgent need to freeze the entire situation and to ensure that 
they would not be harmed by anyone still lingering in the 
apartment. Officer Knudsen thus believed that a security sweep 
of the premises provided the most reasonable means of creating an 
immediate zone of safety. Because the officer's belief was 
7
 Defendant argues that the capture of the seven fleeing 
men dissipated any exigency that might have been created by their 
flight (Br. of App. at 15). To support this argument, defendant 
relies on State v. Wells, 928 P.2d 386 (Utah App. 1996). Wells, 
however, addresses a search incident to arrest, under 
circumstances where the police knew they had physical control not 
only of defendant, but of everyone else in the apartment. That 
is, at the time of the search in Wells, a zone of safety had 
already been ensured. Here, while the seven men had been secured 
on the sidewalk, the situation inside the apartment was still 
unknown. Consequently, the need for an immediate protective 
sweep was apparent to the officers. See Beavers, 859 P.2d at 18 
(citing United States v. Robertson, 606 F.2d 853, 859 (9th Cir. 
1979). 
17 
reasonable under the totality of the circumstances confronting 
him, this Court should uphold the trial court's determination 
that an exigency Existed justifying the warrantless entry. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
third degree felony conviction for possession or use of a 
controlled substance (marijuana) in a drug free zone, a second or 
subsequent violation. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH# 
vs, 
Plaintiff, 
STUART EARL JOHNSEN# 
Defendant(s). 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 961401667 FS 
Judge Guy R. Burningham 
This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Guy R. Burningham 
presiding, on the 1st day of July, 1997. The Plaintiff was represented 
by Deputy Utah County Attorney James R. Taylor. The Defendant was 
present, in person, and represented by Christine Sagendorf. The Court 
heard evidence on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Being advised in 
the premises, the Court makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On November 16, 1997 police officers were dispatched to 980 
North 646 West in Provo because a neighbor was complaining about 
marijuana being used in an adjoining apartment. 
2. Officers arrived, just before midnight, and spoke on the street 
outside the apartment to two men, Troy Guevara and Jason Campbell, who 
stated that they lived upstairs from the complained-of apartment and 
could smell the odor of burned or burning marijuana coming from the 
apartment. The men told officers that they didn't believe the renter or 
owner of the apartment was present but was at work and that they didn't 
know or recognize any of the people in the apartment. They pointed to 
a third person and told officers that "he's one of them". 
3. Officers spoke to the third man, J.C. Thomas Anderson. The 
officer who spoke to Anderson, Officer Knutzen, could detect an odor of 
marijuana coming from Anderson. Anderson said he didn't live in the 
apartment and was just visiting. 
4. Officer Knutzen, at that point, reasonably suspected that a 
burglary or trespass might be taking place. 
5. The officers then approached the suspect apartment which was 
the basement or downstairs apartment. As the officers started at the 
top of the stairs to go down to the door they noticed that the front 
door to the apartment was open one to two feet. As they walked down the 
stairs, someone from inside shut the door. 
6. Officer Knutzen knocked several times on the door. As he 
knocked and waited, he heard a great deal of rustling and movement 
inside the apartment. At this point the officer had a heightened 
suspicion of criminal activity within the apartment. The officer 
checked the front door to see if it was locked and discovered that it 
was not locked. He then pushed the door open to approximately the same 
as it had been when he started down the stairs. The room was dark and 
nothing was seen or heard by the officer when the door was opened. The 
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officer called out that he was a police officer and wished to speak to 
someone. When the door was opened the officer caught a strong smell of 
burned marijuana. The officers were, at that point, told that people 
were climbing out of the back window of the apartment and fleeing the 
scene. 
7. Several officers participated for about 10 to 15 minutes 
chasing and apprehending 7 to 8 people who had climbed out the back 
window and fled the scene. All were brought back and asked if they 
lived in the apartment or knew who did. All replied that they did not 
live there and none could identify the owner or tenant. 
8. Opening the door to the apartment, under the totality of the 
facts, did not cause the people to flee out the back of the apartment as 
evidenced by someone closing the door as the officer approached followed 
by movement and rustling and the almost simultaneous departure of 8 
people out the back as the officer was calling out in front. 
9. Before conducting a protective sweep of the apartment, officers 
had determined, (1) that the neighbors had detected the odor of 
marijuana and knew the tenant to not be home; (2) that a person 
identified by the neighbors as one of the people who had been in the 
apartment did smell of burned marijuana; (3) that someone had closed the 
door of the apartment as the officers approached on the stairs to speak 
with the people in the apartment; (4) that an odor of marijuana was 
emanating from the apartment's door when it was opened by the officer; 
(5) that at least 7 people fled out the back window as officers were 
attempting to speak with them at the front door; and, (6) that the 7 
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people who fled, when caught and brought back to the scene did not live 
in the apartment and could not identify who the tenant was. 
10. Out of concern for officer safety for fear that an additional 
person or persons might still be inside the apartment and also because 
the officers felt that any additional persons inside the apartment did 
not belong there and were committing a trespass or burglary, two 
officers walked through the apartment to check for additional suspects 
as a "security sweepM. 
11. During the sweep officers found the defendant hiding in a 
locked bathroom. Officers also saw drug paraphernalia which was not 
seized but merely described in an affidavit in support of a search 
warrant which was obtained and executed, resulting in the seizure of the 
evidence sought to be suppressed by this motion. 
From the forgoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1#„ Officers had a reasonable suspicion that the crimes of 
trespass, burglary and/or use of controlled substances were being 
committed in the apartment after hearing the statements of the 
complaining citizens and speaking to the third man identified as one of 
the group in the apartment. 
2. Officers had probable cause to believe that criminal conduct was 
occurring within the apartment and that important evidence would be 
found in the apartment upon considering the statements of the neighbors, 
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the encounter with the man identified as "one of them", observing the 
door to the apartment close as the officers descended the stairs, 
observing the sound of movement and rustling inside the apartment before 
knocking on the door. 
3. The occupants1 flight from a rear window of the apartment as 
officers were attempting to make contact at the front door was virtually 
simultaneous with the actions of the door opening and calling to 
occupants by the officer. The flight was not caused by the officer's 
actions. 
4. The actions of the occupants, however, in fleeing the scene and 
then refusing to identify the owner or occupant or otherwise explain 
their actions provided exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless 
entry into the home to determine if any crime was ongoing. 
5. The security sweep of the apartment after apprehending the 
people who fled from the apartment was justified by the probable cause 
that a crime had been or was occurring within the apartment coupled with 
exigent circumstances consisting of a legitimate concern for officer 
safety because of a potential threat from unknown persons who may have 
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still been inside the apartment and the need to stop what appeared to be 
a trespass or burglary that was taking place. 
DATED this If day of August, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
GUV R. /BURNINGHMT y'-W.
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